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ISSUES ON APPEAL
Whether or not discovery has revealed disputed and material facts to support
Plaintiffs claims against Utah County Government.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This case arises out of a dispute concerning the denial of Plaintiff s insurance
claim on his ex-wife's dependent life insurance policy. Plaintiff claims that he is entitled
to the life insurance proceeds as the former husband of the named insured, Sherrie
Ellison. Plaintiffs basis for this claim is that he was not informed by a certain,
unidentified Utah County government employee and Hartford Insurance representatives
concerning the status of the dependent life insurance policy when he got divorced and the
implications for his role as the beneficiary.
The material facts are largely undisputed in this case. At all relevant times,
Plaintiff was a full-time employee of Utah County. As a benefit of his employment, he
qualified to have life insurance on his dependents, including his wife at the time, Sherrie
Ellison. Plaintiff elected to take out a dependent life insurance policy for his wife and the
payments were made via deductions from his paycheck. Plaintiff and Ms. Ellison
divorced in late August, 2003 and the deductions continued to be withdrawn from his
paycheck until shortly after Ms. Ellison's death in late October, 2003.
Approximately a year before his divorce and his ex-wife's death, Plaintiff claims
to have spoken with an unknown and unidentified Utah County employee in the hall of

the Utah County Government building. Plaintiff claims that this unidentified County
employee informed him that his soon-to-be, ex-wife could continue to have dependent life
insurance coverage as long as he continued to pay the premiums, which he could confirm
with the insurance carrier, Hartford. Plaintiff claims that he followed up with Hartford
and received confirmation that an ex-spouse could continue to have life insurance
coverage if the premiums were paid.
Approximately a week after her death, Plaintiff made a claim against Ms. Ellison's
dependent life insurance policy. Plaintiffs claim was denied because, after the divorce,
Ms. Ellison no longer qualified as a dependent under the definition in the policy.
Moreover, his claim was denied because Ms. Ellison, as the named insured, did not go
through the conversion process for her dependent policy to ensure Plaintiffs continuation
as beneficiary.
After an unsuccessful appeal of the denial of his claim, Plaintiff filed a civil action
against Utah County government for the alleged oral misrepresentations made by this
unknown and unidentified County employee with respect to keeping a former spouse as a
dependent in a supplemental dependent life insurance policy. The trial court granted Utah
County's motion for summary judgment in a respects for lack of evidence.
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
1.

Plaintiff began full-time employment with Utah County in July 1995. See

Deposition of Val Ellison ("Ellison Dep.") at p. 7, Record p. 375.
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2.

As a benefit of his employment, Utah County provided life insurance to

Plaintiff as well as supplemental life insurance coverage for his dependents, including his
then-wife Sherrie Ellison. Complaint ^ 1 1 , Record p. 10.
3.

At that time, Plaintiff elected to purchase a dependent life insurance policy

in the amount of $200,000 in the name of Sherrie Ellison. Id. at f 12.
4.

Plaintiff paid the premiums on Ms. Ellison's supplemental dependent life

insurance policy with automatic deductions from his paycheck. Id. at ^| 14
5.

Ms. Ellison was diagnosed with terminal pancreatic cancer in 2001. Id. at f

6.

Plaintiff and Ms. Ellison, represented by respective counsel, filed for

15.

divorce and this Court subsequently entered a ten-page Decree of Divorce on August 21,
2003. See Decree of Divorce, Record pp. 451-461.
7.

The divorce decree ordered Plaintiff to provide health and dental insurance

for their minor children and be responsible for the premiums and costs to maintain such
insurance. Id at p. 6, *f 8, Record p. 456.
8.

The decree also ordered that Ms. Ellison "be entitled to obtain health

insurance under the COBRA Plan" through his employment with Utah County. Id. at f 9.
9.

With respect to life insurance, the decree also stated that "[i]t is reasonable

and proper [for Plaintiff] to maintain a life insurance policy on his life as available
through his place of employment at reasonable cost during the children's minority with as
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much coverage as possible, with the children as the sole beneficiaries and Wells Fargo
Bank designated as the trustee." IcL at p. 10,118, Record p. 452.
10.

Nothing in the Decree of Divorce speaks to obtaining or maintaining a life

insurance policy on Ms. Ellison's life, nor the designation of beneficiaries for any life
insurance on her. Id
11.

Ms. Ellison died on October 27, 2003. Complaint f 19, Record p. 9.

12.

In anticipation of their divorce, but unsure as to the exact time frame,

Plaintiff claims to have spoken with an unknown and unidentified employee of the
"County's Human Resources Department" sometime at "the end of 2001, beginning of
2002", or "end of 2002, beginning 2003," to "continu[e] his insurance policy on his
terminally ill ex-wife after the divorce." See Complaint ^ 17, Record p. 9; see also,
Ellison Dep., pp. 17-18, 51, Record pp. 364-365, 331.
13.

Prior to their divorce, Plaintiff informed Ms. Ellison of the supplemental

dependent life insurance policy on her name through his employment. See Ellison Dep.,
pp. 58-59, Record pp. 323-24.
14.

Unsure as to the dates, Plaintiff alleges that this unknown and unidentified

employee of Utah County's Personnel office informed him that Ms. Ellison's dependent
life insurance coverage would continue after their divorce as long as he continued to pay
the premiums, but that he should confirm with the insurance carrier, Hartford. Id. at p.
18, Record p. 364.
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15.

Plaintiff alleges that nobody from Utah County government informed him at

any time of a required procedure to convert Ms. Ellison's dependent life insurance policy
after their divorce. IdL
16.

After his divorce, but before Ms. Ellison's death, Plaintiff was informed by

Laura Hammish, a county Personnel department employee, that leaving Ms. Ellison on his
health insurance would constitute insurance fraud. IcL at pp. 66-68, Record pp. 314-16;
see also 09/16/2003 E-mail, Record p. 447.
17.

Plaintiff also testified that he spoke with Peggy Poulsen, Utah County's

benefits specialist, "two or three" times concerning a claim for Ms. Ellison's dependent
life insurance. See Ellison Dep., p. 33, Record p. 349.
18.

Approximately one week after Ms. Ellison's death, Plaintiff e-mailed

several Personnel office employees, including Peggy Poulsen, asking if anyone
remembered a conversation "about continuing life insurance on my wife even if we got
divorced." See 11/16/06 e-mail, Record p. 447.
19.

Ms. Poulsen replied that she "[did] not recall having a conversation with

[Plaintiff] on anything other than COBRA (which continues health and dental insurance)
and the QDRO for retirement issues" and that she "was not even aware [Plaintiff] had a
life insurance policy on [Ms. Ellison]." IcL
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20.

Ms. Poulsen explained in her responsive e-mail to Plaintiff that, as a

divorcee herself, she was "quite certain" that she "would not have told [Plaintiff] Sherrie
could stay on any of [his] policies once [he was] divorced." Id.
21.

She also informed Plaintiff that she could not recall any county employee

making a life insurance claim on an ex-spouse and having been paid. She mentioned that
she was confident that she would remember such an occurrence because there were not a
lot of life insurance claims handled by the Personnel office. Id
22.

After Ms. Ellison's death, Ms. Poulsen informed Plaintiff that he "couldn't

file a claim, [because] Sherrie was no longer a dependent." See Ellison Dep., at p. 34,
Record p. 348.
23.

Concerning the conversion of a dependent life insurance policy, Ms.

Poulsen testified as follows:
Q.

A.

What's your understanding of who would have to fill out that
form in order for supplemental life insurance to be provided
to an ex-spouse?
It's my understanding that the person losing the coverage
because they've lost their dependent status needs to request
the form and complete it.

See Deposition of Peggy Poulsen ("Poulsen Dep."), p. 57, Record 443.
24.

Ms. Poulsen also explained the employee's responsibility, if he decided to

continue insurance coverage for a spouse after divorce: "[T]he employee needed to tell
the spouse they no longer had dependent coverage, and needed to contact the Hartford to
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do a conversion, or to contact Personnel to find out the proper procedure." IcL at 26,
Record p. 444.
25.

Ms. Poulsen also testified that the employee "need[ed] to provide a copy of

the divorce decree within 30 days and apply for a conversion policy." Id. at 75, Record p.
438.
26.

Ms. Poulsen also explained that she did not know that Plaintiff "at any time

ever provide[d] Utah County with any written documentation from his ex-spouse that
indicated that his ex-spouse wanted to continue life insurance." Id. at p. 58, Record p.
442.
27.

Ms. Poulsen was not aware "of any communication in any form from

Sherrie Ellison at any time which informed Utah County that Sherrie Ellison wanted to
continue supplemental life insurance after her divorce to Mr. Ellison." Id
28.

Had Plaintiff informed Ms. Poulsen about dependent life insurance for an

ex-spouse, she "would have informed him that the ex-spouse needed to contact Personnel
for conversion information, and would apply for conversion through Hartford." Id. at p.
61, Record p. 441.
29.

Copies of the Hartford policy and information packets, which included

termination information and information on conversion of a life insurance policy after it
terminates, where made available to all employees, which included Plaintiff. Id at pp.
33, 59-60, Record 188, 162-161. Ms. Poulsen testified that Utah County held a mandatory
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Benefits Fair each year in which ample information from each insurance carrier was
provided and available to Utah County employees. Id. at 19-22, Record 199-202.
Hartford in particular had a booth, and a representative named Tori at the Benefits Fair in
2002. I d at 18:16-25, Record p. 203.
30.

Prior to the death of Plaintiff s ex-wife, Utah County did not receive a

request indicating that Ms. Ellison intended to continue her life insurance through
Hartford or needed to convert the dependent life insurance policy. IcL at 73^74, Record
pp. 440-439.
31.

When asked to produce evidence that his ex-wife would have completed

and signed a conversion form to continue supplemental life insurance on her, and that she
would have named Plaintiff as the sole beneficiary, Plaintiff clearly testified that he does
not have "any written evidence" and only supposed and assumed that he is "quite sure she
would have" designated him as the beneficiary simply from "just knowing her." Ellison
Dep., pp. 93-94, Record pp. 289-88. There is no other testimony supporting this
assumption regarding Ms. Ellison's disposition.
32.

"Dependent" is a defined term under the Hartford life insurance policy.

The policy contract defines it as being "Your spouse" and "Your unmarried children."
See Hartford Memo. p. 4. Record p. 406 (Ex. 2 at 38.).
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33.

The policy contract provided that dependent coverage ends on the date

when "the Dependent no longer meets the definition of Dependent." Id, In this case, it
ended on August 21, 2003-the date this Court entered its Decree of Divorce.
34.

Under the "conversion provision5' of the dependent life insurance policy,

the named insured, Ms. Ellison, "must, within 31 days of the date group coverage
terminates, make written application to Us and pay the premium for his age and class of
risk." id.
ARGUMENT
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that judgment "shall be
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Emphasis
added.) All inferences that reasonably can be drawn from the facts should be drawn in
favor of the nonmoving party. See Ho v. Jim's Enter., Inc., 29 P.3d 633, 634 (Utah 2001);
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The party opposing summary
judgment has the duty to "set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for
trial." DLB Collection Trust by Helgesen & Waterfall v. Harris, 893 P.2d 593 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995) (quoting Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e)). "[BJare contentions unsupported by any
specification of facts in support thereof, raise no material questions of fact as will
preclude entry of summary judgment." Massey v. Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937,
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938 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added). Moreover, a party opposing summary judgment must
do so with admissible evidence. Gary Porter Constr. v. Fox Constr., Inc., 101 P.3d 371,
377 (Utah App. 2004) (emphasis added).
In the present case, there are no disputed issues of material fact, indeed, there are
very few disputed facts at all. The few facts that are disputed, are not material to the
claims and allegations raised by Plaintiff or they are merely bare contentions, unsupported
by the evidence. Because there are no genuine issues of material fact, the trial court could
and did appropriately render judgment as a matter of law on all of Plaintiff s claims.
The primary purpose of summary judgment "is to pierce the allegations of the
pleadings, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, although an issue may be
raised by the pleadings, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." Dupler v.Yates. 351 P.2d 624, 629 (Utah 1960). The aim of a motion for
summary judgment is also to determine whether the "controversy can be settled as a
matter of law, that will save the time, trouble and expense of a trial." Rich v. McGovern.
551 P.2d 1266, 1268 (Utah 1976).
POINT I.

PLAINTIFF FAILS TO ESTABLISH A NEGLIGENCE CLAIM
FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE OF PRIMA FACIE ELEMENTS.

To prevail in a negligence claim, a plaintiff has the burden of proving four
elements: duty, breach of duty, causation and damages. See Rocky Mountain Thrift
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Stores v. Salt Lake City Corp., 887 P.2d 848, 851 (Utah 1994). Plaintiff cannot provide
enough evidence to establish these elements at trial.
A.

Utah County Does Not Owe Plaintiff a Duty in this Matter.

"It is axiomatic that one may not be liable to another in tort absent a duty."
Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 765-66 (Utah 1987). A duty of care is "an
essential element of a negligence claim." Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah
1989). "Duty is a question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the
benefit of a particular plaintiff and determining if such duty exists is "entirely a question
of law to be determined by the court." Ferree v. State. 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989).
In the present case, extensive discovery has failed to produce any evidence
substantiating Plaintiffs negligence claim because there is no evidence supporting
Plaintiffs allegations that Utah County owed him a duty. Plaintiff asserts that Utah
County government owed him a legal duty to instruct him on how and when to convert a
supplemental dependent life insurance policy. In so doing, Plaintiffs negligence claim
asserts a heretofore, unknown legal duty owed by an employer to its employee with
respect to providing complete and accurate information about his benefits, such as a life
insurance policy at issue in this case. In other words, Plaintiff asked the trial court to
create a common law duty by Utah County to, not only make a Hartford representative
and information packet available to him at a job fair, but to affirmatively del ail and
communicate the process by which his potential ex-wife may convert her dependent life
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insurance policy after divorce. No such duty exists under Utah law and should not be
created under the facts of this case.
In Larson v. Wycoff Company, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed summary
judgment for an employer who was sued after its employee was denied life insurance
benefits for his deceased son. See, 624 P.2d 1151 (Utah 1981). In Larson, the plaintiff
began working for Wycoff Co. as a part-time dock worker. Although he did not initially
receive benefits, Larson eventually became a full-time employee and obtained benefits
that included life insurance and dependent life insurance coverage. Id. at 1153. In
addition to his own policy, Larson obtained a $2,000 dependent life insurance policy on
his son. Id.
Approximately one year later, Larson transferred to a different position with
Wycoff and his hours were reduced to 25-30 per week. Id. The reduction in hours meant
that Larson no longer qualified for benefits under the terms of the policy, which stated
that "all active, full-time employees may be included in the company's group benefit plan
the first of the month following completion of thirty (30) days of service, provided they
complete an enrollment card as required by the personnel office and they are working as
full-time employees 40 or more hours per week." Id Because Larson was no longer
employed full-time, the insurance carrier denied his claim for benefits. Larson sued his
employer claiming they had breached a duty to inform him that his benefits had been
terminated. See id.

005678 00006

-4-

In affirming summary judgment for the employer, the Utah Supreme Court relied
upon the general proposition that an employer need not give notice of a policy lapsing "in
the absence of a policy provision or statute requiring notice." IdL at 1154 (quoting
American Western Life Ins. Co. v. Hooker. 622 P.2d 775 (Utah 1980)). The Utah
Supreme Court reasoned that Larson was on notice of the terms of the insurance contract,
so his employer could not be held liable. See id
For the same reasons as those elucidated in Larson, the Court should"affirm
summary judgment in favor of Utah County in the present case. The Hartford policy
governed the relationship between Hartford and Plaintiff, and Plaintiff knew or should
have known that, "[u]nless continued in accordance with the Exception to Termination
section, a covered Dependent's insurance will terminate on the earliest of: . . . the date
you are no longer eligible for dependent coverage [or] the date the dependent no longer
meets the definition meets the definition of dependents." Likewise, there is no policy
provision or statute requiring notice of the termination of the dependant life insurance
policy in this matter.
Under the definition section of the insuring contract, a dependent is defined as
6t

your spouse." On August 21, 2003, when Ms. Ellison divorced her husband, she was no

longer his spouse and no longer his dependent. As in Larson, Plaintiff was adequately
informed of the termination provisions of the insurance coverage, and therefore he was
responsible for determining his own insurance needs and providing for them when his
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circumstances changed. Plaintiffs bare allegations that he stopped some unknown
employee of the County to talk about a continuation of his soon to be ex-wife's life
insurance is not enough to create a duty in this case.
Because there is no principle of common law, no policy provision and no statute
that required Utah County to give Plaintiff notice that Ms. Ellison's dependent life
insurance coverage terminated when she no longer qualified as a dependent, Plaintiffs
negligence claim against Utah County fails as a matter of law for a lack of duty.
B.

There is no Evidence that Utah County Breached any Duty.

Assuming for the sake of argument that Utah County owed a duty to maintain
complete and orderly files with respect to employee fringe benefits and to affirmatively
inform Plaintiff of how to convert a dependent life insurance policy, the documentary
evidence and deposition testimony fail to show how Utah County breached this duty.
Plaintiffs own testimony clearly shows that he was told to confirm the status of
life insurance coverage for his soon-to-be ex-wife with the insurance carrier, Hartford.
Therefore, any duty that Plaintiff alleges was owed him by Utah County, was fulfilled in
referring Plaintiff to the insurance carrier for verification and for further instructions as to
how to convert and continue to insure his soon-to-be ex-wife.
Furthermore, holding Utah County liable because it referred Plaintiff to Hartford
or did not inform him regarding the necessity of converting the policy or continue to
insure his ex-wife would essentially mean that Plaintiff did not have a personal
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responsibility to educate himself with the insurance policy and any conversion process. It
is undisputed that Utah County held a benefits fair every year and that Hartford had a
booth with all the information about their policy available in 2002. The County made
information and copies of the policy, including the conversion provision, available to
Plaintiff. It was the plaintiffs responsibility to read and understand his own policy and
Plaintiff should be held responsible for his own lackadaisical approach to ensuring the
dependant life insurance continued when he knew that his wife was terminally ill and
knew that they would soon be divorced. Indeed, considering these facts, Plaintiff is in a
better position than anyone regarding his need to learn about that process for ensuring the
dependent policy's continuation after his divorce.1
C

Utah County's Actions Did not Cause Plaintiffs Injury.

With respect to the prima facie element of causation, "an essential element in a
negligence action is that the plaintiff establish the necessary connection between the
defendant's negligence and the plaintiffs injury." Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d
1360, 1367 (Utah 1986). The Utah Supreme Court explained in detail:
A plaintiff s inability to establish evidence of factual cause is fatal to his or her
negligence claim. The classic formulation for determining factual cause is that
a defendant's negligent act or omission must be a necessary antecedent to the
plaintiffs injury. . . . The plaintiff must introduce evidence which affords a
1

There is no evidence that Utah County personnel knew that Plaintiffs wife was
ill prior to his divorce. Indeed, Plaintiff cannot testify that he ever fully informed anyone
at Utah County of the extent of his wife's illness. (See Ellison Dep. pp. 106-108; Record
pp. 276-274.)
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reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the
conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the result. A mere possibility
of such, causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure
speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it
becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant.
Id
Assuming, for the purpose of a Motion for Summary Judgment only, that Utah
County in fact owed a legal duty to Plaintiff in this matter, the documentary evidence and
deposition testimony fail to establish how the comments of an unknown and.unidentified
Utah County employee, that Ms. Ellison's life could continue to be insured as Plaintiffs
dependent after their divorce, was the proximate cause of Plaintiff s alleged damages. As
the Supreme Court explained in Weber, Utah County's negligent act or omission must be
a necessary antecedent to the denial of Plaintiff s claim for the dependent life insurance
policy on his former wife. In this case, there is a complete lack of evidence in support of
the causal connection between the comments by the mystery Utah County employee and
the denial of the claim.
Without this evidentiary support, Plaintiffs only recourse to prove causation by a
series of assumptions, speculations, and personal belief. First, he asks the court to assume
that he would have disregarded the mis-information he allegedly got from Hartford about
continuing his ex-wife's policy and demanded a conversion form despite the fact that they
told him he did not need one. Second, he asks the court to assume that his wife would
have elected to convert her dependent life insurance policy and then name him as the
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beneficiary after their divorce; despite any evidence to support that she would have done
so. Third, he asks the court to believe that Hartford would have approved the claim and
he would have received the $200,000 from the policy. Clearly, Plaintiffs speculation
about the way things would have happened and his rank conjecture of his ex-wife's intent
is insufficient evidence to conclude that Plaintiff was damaged as a result of Utah
County's actions.
In light of the foregoing, judgment as a matter of law is warranted in this case
because Plaintiff fails to establish the prima facie elements of negligence. Namely, he
fails to establish any alleged legal obligation owed by Utah County to him, breach of the
alleged duty, and proof of a causal connection between the denial of his claim and the
statements of an unknown Utah County employee that as long as he kept paying the
premiums after divorce, he would receive the proceeds of the dependent life insurance
after his wife's death.
POINT II.

PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT HAS
NO SUPPORT IN THE FACTS OR THE LAW.

"The elements of a prima facie case for breach of contract are (1) a contract, (2)
performance by the party seeking performance, (3) breach of the contract by the other
party, and (4) damages." Bair v. Axiom Design. LLC, 20 P.3d 388, 392 (Utah 2001).
Plaintiff claims that his employment contract was breached by Utah County when
an unidentified county employee allegedly informed him that the dependent life insurance
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policy on the name of his soon-to-be ex-wife would continue as long as the premiums
were paid. Plaintiff further claims that the breach of contract occurred when he was
allegedly not informed of the procedure to convert the life insurance policy on his
dependent spouse after the divorce. Plaintiffs claim for breach of contract fails as a
matter of law because he cannot establish and prove the essential elements of the claim.
In the first instance, Plaintiff has not produced a written contract between his
employer, Utah County, that would detail the scope of the contractual relationship.
However, even assuming that Plaintiff is relying on a common law, at-will employment
relationship as the underlying contract in his claim, he merely raises the allegation that
Utah County was contractually obligated to him to communicate or provide information
concerning fringe benefits, including supplemental life insurance on his dependents.
Absent evidence of a written contract, or an oral contract, Plaintiff cannot prove the first
element of a prima facie claim for breach of contract-an actual contract.
The minor disputes over whether Utah County handed Plaintiff a copy of the
policy or simply made it available at the annual job fair and whether the mystery
employee told him about necessity of conversion after his divorce are immaterial because
Plaintiff has not produced a contract indicating that such action or inaction would be a
breach.
Plaintiff alleges that Utah County failed to perform its part of the employment
agreement, yet he can only produce his own bare allegations that the erroneous, out-of-
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court comments of an unknown and unidentified employee concerning the status of his
soon-to-be ex-wife's dependent life insurance was a breach of the employment contract.
Plaintiff claims that he was misinformed by the mystery Personnel employee and that he
relied on the oral representations made to him prior to divorcing and prior to the death of
Ms. Ellison. However, Plaintiff fails to provide any information regarding the identity of
the employee, asking this Court only to take his word at face value that her actions were a
breach of the contract. Therefore, not only is there no proof of an actual coritract, there is
no evidentiary support for the performance of either party.
Plaintiffs breach of contract also fails because he has failed to produce evidence
in support of his damages. Breach of contract damages are necessary to place the
aggrieved party in the same economic position the party would have been in if the
contract was not breached. See Mahmood v. Ross, 990 P.2d 933, 937 (Utah 1999).
The Utah Supreme Court has offered the following explanation concerning
damages arising out of a breach of contract claim:
Typically, there are two types of damages a non-breaching party can recover
in an action for breach of contract: "general damages, which flow naturally
from the breach, and consequential damages, which, while not an invariable
result of breach, were reasonably foreseeable by the parties at the time the
contract was entered into." Id. (citing Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d
795, 801 (Utah 1985)).
To recover consequential damages, a non-breaching party must prove (1)
that consequential damages were caused by the contract breach; (2) that
consequential damages ought to be allowed because they were foreseeable
at the time the parties contracted; and (3) the amount of consequential
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damages within a reasonable certainty.
Mahmood, 990 P.2d at 937-38. In Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 466
(Utah 1996), the Court ruled that consequential damages are limited to those reasonably
foreseeable or contemplated by the parties when contract was entered into.
Assuming, only for the purposes of this appeal, that Plaintiff has evidentiary
support of an employment contract, Plaintiff fails to show any general or consequential
damages resulting from the alleged breach of the contract by Utah County. It is wellestablished that the purpose of breach of contract damages is to place the plaintiff in an
economic position that he would have been in had the breach not occurred.
Plaintiff cannot prove general damages because no evidence exists that he incurred
any damages as a result of his reliance on the comments of an unknown Utah County
employee on an unknown date. Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to $200,000 for the life
of his ex-wife after they divorced because his claim was denied by Hartford due to Ms.
Ellison's failure to convert the dependent life insurance policy after their divorce.
However, Plaintiff does not provide any evidence that Ms. Ellison's failure to convert the
policy was due to the comments of the unidentified personnel employee-the court is to
simply assume that she would have converted it had Plaintiff been told about the
conversion by the personnel employee.
Regardless, Plaintiff was advised by the employee that he should confirm with the
insurance company what steps must be taken to change the status of a dependent policy
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after he and his spouse divorced. Thus, the onus was on the plaintiff to educate himself
and arrange his own affairs in anticipation of his divorce; the same way he did for his
own health, dental, and life insurance and for the benefit of his minor children in the
divorce decree. Plaintiff cannot show that he would have asked his wife to convert the
policy (despite the information given him by Hartford), that she indeed would have
converted it and that Hartford would have processed and paid the claim.
With regard to the recovery of consequential damages, Plaintiff fails to prove that
his alleged consequential damages were caused by the breach of his employment contract
by Utah County. Specifically, Plaintiff fails to establish that he incurred any
consequential damages because no such damages were foreseeable at the inception of his
employment in 1995. As the court explained in Mahmood, to recover consequential
damages, the plaintiff must prove "that consequential damages ought to be allowed
because they were foreseeable at the time the parties contracted." 990 P.2d at 938.
Because the damages were not reasonably foreseeable or contemplated by Plaintiff and/or
Utah County in 1995, Plaintiffs claim for breach of contract fails as a matter of law.
POINT III. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF FRAUD
ON THE PART OF UTAH COUNTY GOVERNMENT.
Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "in all averments of
fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with
particularity." In Taylor v. Gasor, 607 P.2d 293, 294-95 (Utah 1990), the Supreme Court
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noted the following:
A finding of fraud must be based on the existence of all its essential elements,
i.e., the making of a false representation concerning a presently existing
material fact which the representor either knew to be false or made recklessly
without sufficient knowledge, or the omission of a material fact when there is
a duty to disclose, for the purpose of inducing action on the part of the other
party, with actual, justifiable reliance resulting in damage to that party. . . . As
stated in Lundstrom v. Radio Corporation of America, 405 P.2d 339, 341
(1965), "fraud is a wrong of such nature that it must be shown by clear and
convincing proof and will not lie in mere suspicion or innuendo."
Accordingly, the law requires that averments of fraud be pled with particularity. See id.
In this case, Plaintiffs fraud claim fails for lack of evidentiary support.
Specifically, Plaintiff has failed to establish the identity of the Utah County Personnel
employee whom he claims misinformed him; Plaintiff has failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the oral representations made by this mystery personnel
employee were actually made; and Plaintiff cannot show that the (unidentified)
misrepresentor knew the comments she made were false and/or reckless. Absent more
specific or concrete evidence supporting these essential elements of fraud, Plaintiffs
claim for fraud fails as a matter of law.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Plaintiffs allegations are true
and he was told by Utah County that his es-wife's life insurance would continue if he
simply paid his premiums, he admits to also being informed by the mystery employee to
confirm the information directly with the insurance carrier, Hartford. This fact is critical
because it shows that there was no intent to deceive Plaintiff and that the comments were
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not recklessly made; the mystery employee told Plaintiff what she believed to be the truth,
but advised him to confirm her comments with the insurance carrier.2 Therefore, under
Plaintiffs version of the facts, there still can be no fraud.
Plaintiff spends many pages of his appeal brief arguing that whether he acted with
reasonable diligence or reasonably relied upon the representations by Utah County are
questions of fact. While that may or may not be true, it is wholly irrelevant in this matter
because Plaintiff has failed to show that a representation was actually made^a
requirement under Utah law. See Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,
21 P.3d 198, 207-08 (Utah 2001). Because Plaintiff relies solely on his own
unsubstantiated testimony that a Utah County employee made an erroneous comment
about the conversion of his wife's supplemental dependent life insurance policy, he
cannot show by clear and convincing evidence that the statement upon which he bases his
fraud claim was actually made and cannot succeed at trial.

2

It is worth noting that a Divorce Decree was entered after deliberations and
negotiations between each parties' legal counsel. The Divorce Decree is specific in the
obligations and responsibilities of each party with respect to the allocation of assets and
debts, visitation rights, and including several provisions concerning insurance. In
particular, the Divorce Decree is detailed and explicit with respect to Plaintiffs
responsibility to have health and dental coverage for the minor children as well as to
insure his own life through his employment. Noticeably absent however, is any
information concerning a life insurance policy on Ms. Ellison. A detailed divorce decree,
negotiated with the assistance of counsel, would also have mentioned Ms. Ellison's
dependent life insurance policy and her intent to leave Plaintiff as the beneficiary if there
was indeed such an agreement.
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Discovery has failed to produce any evidence that the statement was made in the
first place, but even if the statement was made, no evidence exists as to who made it.
Without knowledge of, or the ability to establish, the identity of the person Plaintiff
blames for misinforming him, plaintiff cannot prove to a jury the comment was made.
Simply stated, Plaintiffs allegations must be substantiated by the evidence, and none has
been produced and discovered in this case. See Winter v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 820
P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1991) ("allegations of a pleading or factual conclusion of an affidavit
are insufficient to raise a general issue of fact.").
To establish a fraud claim, Franco also requires a misrepresentation to be made
with "insufficient knowledge upon which to base such representation," which Plaintiff
also fails to prove with clear and convincing evidence. Id. In particular, plaintiff testified
that was informed by the mystery county personnel employee to contact the insurance
company "to make sure or to have any other questions answered." (Ellison Dep., p. 106;
Record p. 276.) Clearly, plaintiff was referred to Hartford for substantiation and
clarification. Therefore, Plaintiffs own testimony shows that the county employee did
not have an intent to deceive or made her comment with insufficient knowledge, rather
referred him to the insurance company for clarification and confirmation. Plaintiff acted
on the statement and called Hartford, who allegedly informed him that as long as
premiums were paid, his wife's life would be covered after the divorce. Thus, any
alleged damage plaintiff incurred was not the result of any actions or statements by the
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county employee.
Considering the undisputed evidence, plaintiff fails to establish a cause of action
for fraud against Utah County because he admittedly has no clear and convincing
evidence he can present to the jury to support his claim.
POINT IV. PLAINTIFF LACKS STANDING TO SUE FOR THE
DEPENDENT LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS.
"As a general rule, a person can sustain a cause of action only where he has
sustained some injury to his legal, personal or property rights, the injury and the cause of
action being contemporaneous." Havmond v. Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc., 89
P.3d 171, 173 (Utah 2004). In order to determine if a plaintiff has standing 1o sue, courts
"first apply traditional standing criteria, which require that (a) the interests of the parties
be adverse, and (b) the parties seeking relief have a legally protectable interest in the
controversy. Plaintiff must be able to show that he has suffered some distinct and
palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute."
Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451, 454 (Utah 1985).
Plaintiff has no standing to sue because he cannot demonstrate that he suffered a
"distinct and palpable injury" by Utah County from the denial of the insurance claim by
Hartford. Plaintiff has not, and cannot, prove that, had his late ex-wife opted to convert
the policy and done the conversion process, he would have been named the beneficiary.
Indeed, the only evidence offered by Plaintiff to show that his ex-wife would have named
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him as the named beneficiary, is his testimony that she would, "just knowing her." This
pure speculation is clearly insufficient evidence of Ms. Ellison's intent.3
Further, in order for Plaintiff to have standing to sue for the proceeds of Ms.
Ellison's life insurance policy, he needs to claim a property right to that policy. It is
undisputed that Ms. Ellison's dependent life insurance policy lapsed on August 21, 2003
when the Decree of Divorce was entered by this Court. On that date, Ms. Ellison's policy
lapsed, and Plaintiffs property rights as a beneficiary ceased, thereby terminating any

3

Plaintiff may claim that an alleged conversation with his wife, in which she told
him to use the life insurance proceeds for the kids' "missions and schooling and so forth"
(see Record; p. 287), is evidence of her intent to convert the policy and name him as the
beneficiary. However, this assertion is without merit for two reasons. First, it is not
evidence of an intent that Ms. Ellison, had she been given the chance after their divorce,
would have simply named him as the beneficiary to do with the money as he saw fit.
Second, this conversation is clearly hearsay. This statement does not fall under the
804(b)(2) "imminent death" exception because there is no evidence that death was
imminent. Before a proponent may offer hearsay under the dying declaration exception,
sufficient evidence must be laid that the declarant had a sense of impending death. See
e.g. United States v. Lawrence, 349 F.3d 109, 117 (3rd Cir. 2003).
Moreover, it is not excepted from hearsay as a statement against interest under
Utah Rule of Evidence, 804(b)(3) because it does not fulfill the elements. A statement
against interest is a "statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to
civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that
a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless
believing it to be true." Even a "statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal
liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement." Ms. Ellision
allegedly made these comments while she was still married to Plaintiff (see Ellison Dep.
p. 95; Record p. 287) when she first got ill and it was not "so far contrary" to her
pecuniary or proprietary interest at that time.
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right for Plaintiff to claim the insurance proceeds. In other words, when Ms. Ellison
(through divorce) failed to be defined as Plaintiffs dependent according to the definitions
of the policy contract and Plaintiffs rights terminated along with Ms. Ellison's insurance
coverage. As a result of this change in status as the beneficiary, Plaintiff lacks the
necessary standing to sue and collect Ms. Ellison's life insurance proceeds. In other
words, Plaintiff did not sustain an injury to his legal or property rights because none
existed when this court entered the Decree of Divorce and effectively terminated the
marriage and any dependent status.
Lastly, Plaintiff fails to show that he suffered a distinct and palpable injury as a
result of Hartford's denial of his claim because, again, he cannot show that, had his exwife elected to convert the policy she would have named him, her ex-husband, as the sole
beneficiary. Plaintiff cannot escape the fact that his claims are founded on the pure
assumption that Ms. Ellison would have opted to give him the proceeds over her adult
children or a trustee as the beneficiary for all the children, including the minors, as it was
done in the Divorce Decree. (See Decree of Divorce, f 18; Record p. 111.) The trial
court was warranted in refusing to "take his word for it" that his ex-wife would have
wanted the $200,000.00 to go to him, as the ex-husband, instead of being distributed
directly to the children.
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POINT V.

PLAINTIFF MAY NOT RELY ON ASSUMPTIONS AND
SUPPOSITIONS THAT HIS DECEASED EX-WIFE WOULD
HAVE NAMED HIM AS THE BENEFICIARY ON HER LIFE
INSURANCE POLICY AFTER THEIR DIVORCE.

It is well-established that the plaintiff has the burden of proving his claims for
negligence and breach of contract by a preponderance of the evidence. See Ahlstrom v.
Salt Lake City Corp.,73 P.3d 315, 317 (Utah 2003); Braddock v. Pacific Woodman Life
Ass'n, 58 P.2d 765 (Utah 1936). Moreover, Plaintiff has the burden of proving his claims
fo fraud by clear and convincing evidence. Republic Group, Inc. vs. Won-door Corp.,
883 P.2d 285, 292 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
In this case, discovery has failed to produce evidence that substantiate and prove
Plaintiffs claims by their respective burdens of proof. Indeed, much or Plaintiffs case
rests on convincing a jury that an unknown and unidentified Utah County employee told
him that as long as he paid the premiums for his wife's dependent life insurance policy,
he would be entitled to the insurance proceeds. Even if Plaintiff could convince a jury
that this were true, he still rests his case on his self-serving, subjective belief that, had his
former wife had an opportunity to convert the dependent policy, she would have named
him, the ex-husband, as the beneficiary of the life insurance policy and given him the
money instead of naming her children or a third-party trustee as the beneficiary on the life
insurance policy. Plaintiff assumes, and would have this court to join him in the
assumption, that "just knowing" Ms. Ellison, she would have named him as the sole
beneficiary. This is simply not enough evidence to get Plaintiff before a jury in this
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matter.
Clearly, Plaintiff fails to establish any evidence that would support Ms. Ellison's
intent as to whom she would have named as beneficiary in the policy. Thus, his
allegations of negligence, breach of contract, and fraud would be moot, because he cannot
prove, as a matter of fact or with any evidentiary support, that following the divorce, Ms.
Ellison was willing and intended to name him as the beneficiary. Thus, summary
judgment was timely and warranted in this case.
POINT VI. PLAINTIFF INAPPROPRIATELY RELIES UPON BARE
ALLEGATIONS AND IMMATERIAL FACTS.
Plaintiff claims that it is disputed whether Utah County provided him with a copy
of the subject policy and that an unidentified, Utah County employee told him that his
divorce would not affect his wife's life insurance policy. While these facts are disputed,
they did not foreclose summary judgment for three reasons. First, even if Plaintiff s
allegations are true, his negligence, fraud and breach of contract claims fail as a matter of
law, as pointed out above. Second, these facts that Plaintiff claims are disputed are
nothing more than his bare contentions with absolutely no support in the record. Third,
the fact that Utah County may or may not have failed to tell Plaintiff about the conversion
process or give him a copy of the policy is immaterial to the question of law before the
court.
Plaintiff alleges that neither party "provided" him with a copy of the Hartford
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insurance policy. However, it is undisputed that Utah County held a mandatory job fair
each year, that Tori, a representative of Hartford was at the 2002 fair and that information
regarding the Hartford life insurance policy was available to Plaintiff at the job fair. The
fact that Utah County did not make Plaintiff take a copy of the policy, did not send him a
copy of the new policy, did not call him in and read the policy to him when he got
divorced or when his ex-wife died is simply immaterial to the question before the court.
The facts show that the information was available to Plaintiff and he refused to
adequately research the issue and just let the matter slide.
Based only upon his own allegations, Plaintiff claims that he was told by some
Utah County Employee that his divorce would not affect his wife's life insurance policy.
Even if Utah County had a duty to tell him that he needed to do more than simply pay the
premiums, Plaintiff can point to no material evidence supporting the occurrence of this
conversation. "[BJare contentions unsupported by any specification of facts in support
thereof, raise no material questions of fact as will preclude entry of summary judgment."
Massev v. Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff claims that the fact that he told Linda Daly at Hartford that he spoke with
a Utah County Employee, tends to prove that he did, yet, he is still relying on a bare
allegation that he has made. It does not matter that Plaintiff told somebody else that he
had a conversation with a Utah County Employee, there is still nothing but his own
statement to indicate that he did have this conversation-which is simply not enough to get
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before a jury.
Plaintiff also claims that the fact that he did not take any actions to convert his exwife's policy tends to show that he was told he did not have to do so. Again, this is a
self-serving and conclusory argument. It is akin to claiming the fact that a diriver failed to
stop at a stop sign, tends to prove that his statement that he did not see the stop sign is
true. Plaintiff is inappropriately using the conclusion to prove the facts. There are
hundreds of explanations to explain why Plaintiff did not convert his ex-wife's policy, the
most plausible being, that she never would have agreed to make him the beneficiary.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Utah County's Motion for Summary Judgment should be
granted. To rule otherwise would be contrary to the explicit and unambiguous language
of the policy contract and adverse to well-established law.
DATED

this Q (J day of October, 2008.
STRONG & HANNI

istin A. VanUrman
Jeremy G. Knight
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees
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